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INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:  
ARGUMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERING 
WITHOUT GLASSES 
John C. Dehn* 
Response to:  Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010). 
In Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, Trevor Morrison provides 
valuable insights into the work of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
that scholars examining executive power or practice should thoroughly 
consider.1  His previous work, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive 
Branch, is required reading for those studying constitutional avoidance 
doctrine generally, or its use in the executive branch specifically.2  In this 
latest effort, Professor Morrison empirically demonstrates that OLC legal 
opinions serve as a form of binding precedent for that office, and posits 
that there are many good reasons for giving those opinions stare decisis 
effect.3 
As Professor Morrison recounts, the idea that Attorney General 
opinions, and by extension those of the OLC, should be treated as a 
form of binding precedent is an old one.4  Professor Morrison’s 
 
* Assistant Professor, United States Military Academy, and J.S.D. candidate, 
Columbia Law School.  I thank Trevor Morrison, Mark Welton, Dan Rice, Rich Meyer, 
Tim Bakken, and particularly Colonel Jody Prescott for their insights and advice, as well as 
Philip Kehl for his excellent editorial assistance.  Any remaining errors are my sole 
responsibility.  A West Point graduate, I have served for over 20 years in the Army in 
various capacities as a commissioned officer, almost 13 of those years as a military lawyer 
or judge advocate.  The views presented here are mine and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Department of Defense, U.S. Army, U.S. Military Academy, or any other 
government department or agency. 
1. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1448 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis]. 
2. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
Colum. L. Rev. 1189 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Avoidance]. 
3. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1455. 
4. Id. at 1470–74 (discussing views of many nineteenth-century Attorneys General in 
favor of adhering to prior Attorney General opinions). 
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descriptive empirical examination provides a deeper understanding of 
the publicly available factors influencing precedential adherence in the 
OLC.5  His normative theoretical inquiry marshals an abundance of 
prudential arguments in favor of the practice of adhering to such 
institutional “precedent,” while proposing limited reasons for 
“overruling” precedent and further echoing the call for increased public 
disclosure of OLC’s work.6  Ultimately, Professor Morrison argues that 
while “‘differences in approach’ from one head of OLC to the next are 
insufficient to support a departure from precedent,” differences in 
approach from one President to the next may, so long as the decision to 
depart from precedent is publicly disclosed.7  “Differences in approach,” 
in this context, appear to be differences in opinion on discrete legal 
issues. 
This response addresses only the normative theoretical inquiry and 
makes one essential point:  Professor Morrison’s analysis relies heavily 
upon institutional considerations and potentially problematic OLC 
perceptions of its role.  He does not consider, and therefore potentially 
undervalues, the proper effect of an OLC attorney’s individual ethical 
and legal obligations.  Potentially problematic OLC practices include its 
identification of the opinion-requesting agency—the President and/or 
the executive branch—as the client.8  This causes OLC, in Morrison’s 
words, to view the law “through a particular lens,” and not to give “the 
best view [of the law]” but “OLC’s best view of the law.”9  Other 
institutional considerations, such as OLC’s legitimacy within the 
executive branch,10 may also cause OLC to misidentify or to over-identify 
with its client(s).  These factors may generate consistent, executive-
friendly error in OLC legal opinions.  Such error diminishes the 
interpretive value of OLC precedent, and thereby the propriety of 
applying judicial stare decisis principles to OLC legal opinions. 
This response briefly introduces how overvaluing executive branch 
institutional interests and undervaluing individual obligations might 
detract from Professor Morrison’s normative analysis.  There are two 
principle sources of individual obligations:  constitutional and ethical.  
First, all officers of the federal government are constitutionally obligated 
to swear an oath, not to the branch, department, office, or official that 
they serve or advise, but to “support” the Constitution.11  Subordinate 
 
5. Id. at 1479–92 (identifying and analyzing factors influencing precedential 
adherence in OLC). 
6. Id. at Part III. 
7. Id. at 1525. 
8. See infra Part I (noting evidence of OLC’s tendency toward over-identification 
with executive branch institutional interests and suggesting weaker attitude toward OLC 
precedent might counter consequences of this tendency). 
9. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1456. 
10. See id. at 1496–97 (arguing credibility gains from adhering to precedent rather 
than will of clients). 
11. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution . . . .”). 
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government officials are required to take such oaths by statute.12  
Additionally, the executive’s obligations to “preserve, protect and defend 
the Constitution of the United States”13 and to “take Care that the laws 
be faithfully executed”14 also devolve upon subordinate executive branch 
officials.15  Finally, all government attorneys, including Department of 
Justice attorneys,16 have an ethical responsibility stemming from federal 
statutes17 and their licensing authority’s codes of professional conduct to 
give independent, competent, and candid advice.18  While further 
analysis of the effect of these obligations in this context is needed, I here 
outline concerns that might support removing the “lens” from OLC’s 
view of both the law and its precedent.  The natural tendency of this lens 
is to distort OLC’s legal analysis.  This tendency counsels against 
observing stare decisis in the OLC. 
It is important to note that while the theoretical space between 
Professor Morrison’s position regarding stare decisis in the OLC and 
mine is large, the practical differences in our views regarding the value 
of OLC precedent is unclear and certainly narrower.  In the end, our 
differences may be more about the general attitude or obligations of an 
OLC or government lawyer toward institutional precedent than the 
particulars of whether and when to “overrule,” distinguish, or modify it. 
 
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006) (prescribing oath for civil servants and uniformed 
services to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic” and to “bear true faith and allegiance to the same”); 28 U.S.C. §  
544 (2006) (requiring Department of Justice attorneys to swear oath to faithfully execute 
their duties).  I will not here address the legal distinction between “officers” of the U.S. 
government and other subordinate officials. 
13. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
14. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
15. See infra Part II (discussing extent to which individual constitutional oaths of 
OLC or other executive branch officials relate to executive branch’s constitutional 
obligations). 
16. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2 (2010) (implementing 28 U.S.C. § 530B and providing that 
“attorney for the government” includes “any attorney employed in . . . a Department of 
Justice agency”). 
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 530B (“An attorney for the Government shall be subject to 
State laws and rules . . . .”). 
18. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2010) (regarding duty of 
competence); id. R. 2.1 (candid advice); id. R. 5.4 (professional independence).  This was 
the conclusion of the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility when 
investigating what have been called the torture memoranda.  See Office of Prof’l 
Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of 
“Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 24 (2009) [hereinafter 
OPR Report], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (requiring attorneys who drafted and reviewed torture memoranda 
to meet “the minimum standards of independent professional judgment, candid advice, 
thoroughness, and care”). 
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I.  INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND THE RISK OF CLIENT OVER-
IDENTIFICATION 
In practicing the craft of government lawyering, an attorney must be 
acutely aware of the risk of over-identification with the client or 
institution that she advises, as well as the potential for misidentification 
of the client.  In the worst case, a lawyer might over-indentify with a 
misidentified client.  This Part briefly notes evidence of OLC’s tendency 
to over-identify with executive branch institutional interests, and how the 
potential consequences of that executive-friendly tendency might be 
countered by adopting a weaker attitude toward OLC precedent. 
Professor Morrison’s description of OLC’s practices is quite familiar 
to me and, I suspect, to many government attorneys.  In my experience 
as an Army lawyer, or “judge advocate,” almost every office providing 
advice to a major military command element, from an Army division or 
installation to the Department of the Army, maintained precedential or 
historical files.  Requests for legal opinions prompted a review of these 
files for similar or related requests and the opinions issued.  If the 
particular office had previously issued a relevant opinion, it was 
considered authoritative, not necessarily “binding.” 
Disagreement with a prior opinion prompted a reexamination of its 
legal rationale.  Minor errors were usually corrected without review.  Any 
decision to significantly alter or repudiate a prior opinion required an 
appropriate level of review and approval.  Although this review was 
almost always necessary when a change would counsel against action that 
a previous opinion had permitted, simple legal error in the prior 
opinion was usually sufficient to “overrule” it.  Of course, the willingness 
to supersede erroneous opinions and the manner by which such 
decisions were communicated depended very much upon the 
personalities of individual supervisory attorneys and the anticipated 
response from the opinion-requesting entity.  Unlike OLC, military 
lawyers and legal offices are dispersed worldwide, which substantially 
hinders development of a homogeneous understanding of institutional 
precedent or an empirical examination of how it is treated. 
A primary reason for adhering to “precedent” in the Army, as in 
OLC, is the perceived legitimacy of the legal office providing the 
opinion.19  Like in OLC, personnel turnover in military legal offices is 
quite high—though career civil servants provide continuity and 
institutional memory.  A legal office will lose credibility with the entities 
and individuals it advises if every change in personnel prompts a change 
in legal advice.20  Of course, institutional legitimacy concerns can 
 
19. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1496. 
20. A secondary consideration in many Army offices, and possibly in OLC, is attorney 
experience with the specific legal issues presented.  Judge advocates are rarely assigned to 
positions based on their demonstrated competence or past experience in a similar or 
identical position.  They are assigned to positions that will broaden their skills or range of 
competence and experience and also measure their potential for promotion and 
increased responsibility.  Consulting precedential files and providing review by a senior 
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sometimes be in tension with the duty to provide objective and accurate 
legal advice.  In some cases, lawyers might need to admit the errors of  
predecessors in order to fully vindicate the duties and responsibilities of 
their positions, including their ethical obligations of competent, candid, 
and independent advice to or on behalf of their clients.  The problem is 
that in the Army, as in OLC, identifying the client is not as 
straightforward as it might seem. 
Army lawyers advise units, offices, or commands within the Army, 
and sometimes joint (meaning multiservice) or multinational 
commands.  There is a natural inclination, due to otherwise appropriate 
cultural norms of loyalty and subordination, to view these entities, their 
commanders, or other principals as the client.  This creates the risk that 
military lawyers will over-identify with or take a vested interest in the 
actual or perceived preferences of the entities or individual(s) they 
advise.  They may tend to shape their advice to their advisee’s preferred 
decision, or to their own idea of what is a situational, advisee-friendly 
view of the law.  Any of these developments might undermine larger 
Army organizational interests.  For this reason, the Army formally 
identifies its attorneys’ client as the “Army,” and not as the individual 
command or entity to which an attorney is assigned, or as the 
commander or other individual(s) she advises.21 
Professor Morrison embraces a view of OLC that both permeates 
and supports his normative analysis.  By accepting at face value how OLC 
alumni describe its role and client,22 he accepts that “OLC’s work should 
‘reflect the institutional traditions of and competencies of the executive 
branch as well as the views of the President who currently holds 
office.’”23  He refers to OLC’s “clients” as “the White House, the Attorney 
General, and the various departments . . . that seek its advice.”24  He 
notes that OLC’s location within the executive branch means that “its 
best view of the law might legitimately differ on some issues from that of 
a differently situated actor.”25  And he cites James Madison for the 
notion that each branch of government must affirmatively resist 
encroachment by the others in order to preserve the separation of 
powers.26  He then asserts that OLC lawyers “are players” in this process, 
 
attorney help to develop inexperienced attorneys.  In OLC, the use of precedent and 
review by senior attorneys may serve a similar function. 
21. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 27-26, Rules of Prof’l Conduct for Lawyers, app. B, 
R. 1.13 (1992) (“[A]n Army lawyer represents the Department of the Army acting through 
its authorized officials . . . [including] the heads of organizational elements within the 
Army, such as the commanders of armies, corps and divisions, and the heads of other 
Army agencies or activities.”). 
22. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1452–54. 
23. Id. at 1455 (quoting Walter Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of 
Legal Counsel (2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:  
Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1603 app. 2 
(2007)). 
24. Id. at 1496–97. 
25. Id. at 1456. 
26. Id. at 1499. 
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and that “Madison’s vision of the separation of powers provides a lens 
through which OLC provides its legal advice.”27 
In spite of this evidence of institutional bias in legal interpretation, 
and the candid statement that “the generally pro-executive tenor in 
OLC’s opinions simply reflects that OLC is part of the executive branch,” 
Professor Morrison does not believe that OLC acts as an “advocate” for 
the President or the executive branch.28  For Professor Morrison, OLC’s 
situational, executive-friendly “best view of the law” is “different from the 
job of an advocate but also need not carry the pretense of ‘true’ 
neutrality.”29  Other OLC alumni share this view.30 
This position seems tenuous.  It is one thing for a lawyer’s 
objectively-derived best view of the law to be that the law governing a 
certain matter is ambiguous in certain respects, and to advise that a 
course of action or policy is arguably consistent with the law, or at least 
not clearly prohibited by it.  This is no doubt often necessary in the OLC.  
The Constitution marks “only its great outlines” and designates only 
“important objects,” but “the minor ingredients which compose those 
objects [must] be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”31  
As Justice Robert Jackson observed, “[a] judge, like an executive adviser, 
may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous 
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they 
actually present themselves.”32  It is quite another matter, though, to 
adopt an admittedly shaded or favorable situational interpretation of the 
law that more affirmatively supports or defends a particular “institutional 
tradition,” prerogative, or policy decision.  Such an interpretation is 
more like advocacy than objective advice.33  It is not spared from this 
 
27. Id. at 1502. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. See Walter Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel 
(2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:  Internal Legal 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1604–07 (2007) (“The advocacy 
model of lawyering . . . inadequately promotes the President’s constitutional obligation to 
ensure the legality of executive action.”); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 
34–35 (2007) (agreeing with Dellinger’s OLC principles). 
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
33. It is important to distinguish between a “contextual” and “situational” 
interpretation of the law, though it is a subtle distinction.  From my perspective, the 
former considers the application of the law to a given set of facts and circumstances in 
light of the reason for which a lawyer’s advice is sought.  It can be “client immaterial,” 
meaning the identity and situation of the client is not necessarily an intrinsic or necessary 
aspect of the legal analysis and advice.  Situational legal analysis and advice considers a 
client’s legal position vis-à-vis other potential actors.  It is only appropriate when providing 
advice to a client as such, in circumstances demanding a situational analysis. 
This distinction is important for lawyers advising internal elements of organizational 
clients.  These internal components might have differing interests based on the internal 
dynamics of the organizational entity, such as those I have articulated with regard to the 
Army.  While either contextual or situational advice may be objective in theory, the latter 
is inherently less so in practice given the analysis of the client’s legal status against that of 
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categorization by the fact that it is an executive branch “office’s best view 
of the law”34 and not that of an individual attorney.35 
Professor Morrison’s position appears largely based on his view of 
the import of Madison’s separation of powers commentary to OLC’s 
role.  Madison stated, as Morrison quotes, that “the great security against 
a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, 
consists in giving to those who administer each department, the 
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist 
encroachment of the others.”36  Professor Morrison takes this to mean 
that OLC should assist the executive in defending its institutional 
prerogatives by interpreting the law through an executive lens.37 
This conclusion does not necessarily follow.  The right and duty to 
interpret the law that the executive must faithfully execute is no doubt 
part of its “constitutional means” of resisting encroachment,38 as is the 
executive’s power to veto a proposed law in the first instance.39  However, 
the need to prevent encroachment does not require an executive-
friendly interpretation of the law.  Only advice that fairly addresses and 
objectively evaluates the scope, limits, and relationship of executive, 
legislative, and judicial power is necessary.40  Objective advice can give 
“the benefit of reasonable doubt as to the law”41 without espousing a view 
of the law that affirmatively supports rather than merely allows a desired 
course of action.  Constitutional ambiguity will unquestionably require 
OLC to extrapolate a great deal from available data, including from its 
 
others.  Professor Morrison would no doubt argue that the executive’s “situation” or 
position within the government is necessarily a part of the context within which OLC must 
interpret the law.  This is a fair point, but one which assumes the identity of the client and 
emphasizes the need for maintaining absolute objectivity in OLC legal analysis and advice.  
The remainder of this Part discusses the potential dangers of situational rather than 
contextual legal interpretation in the executive branch. 
34. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1502 (citation omitted). 
35. But see id. (indicating inattention to situation in which OLC, though not 
engaging in advocacy, by rendering advice as an “office,” may invite erroneous calls for 
OLC to be neutral decision-maker, and which “demands too much of OLC”). 
36. Id. at 1499 (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 321–32 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
37. Id. at 1501. 
38. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 36, at 282 (James Madison) (“[I]n case the 
Congress shall misconstrue . . . the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its 
true meaning, . . . the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary 
departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts . . . .”). 
39. See The Federalist No. 73, supra note 36, at 439–40 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(stating veto power protects against laws that would violate President’s constitutional 
prerogatives). 
40. See, e.g., John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War:  A 
Conceptual Framework, Temp. L. Rev. at Part I (forthcoming Winter 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539257 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown framework does not necessarily imply existence of a preclusive or 
plenary core of Commander-in-Chief power and might simply address an incomplete 
overlap of executive and legislative powers, to be discovered through careful analysis of 
the nature of those powers). 
41. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 35 (citation omitted). 
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prior opinions.  It would seem that only an attempt at true objectivity 
might prevent this extrapolation from becoming purely presidentially 
preferred or executive-friendly conjecture. 
Professor Morrison attempts to assuage any concerns regarding this 
institutionally-sensitive approach to legal interpretation by asserting that 
OLC’s need to “defend its conclusions by means of recognized forms of 
legal argumentation” and to “show that its views are not just plausible but 
are indeed its best view of the law” will prevent “audacious” claims of 
executive power.42  But former OLC head Jack Goldsmith observed that 
“all OLC lawyers and Attorneys General over many decades,” for 
Presidents of both parties, are “driven by the outlook and exigencies of 
the presidency to assert more robust presidential power, especially 
during a war or crisis, than ha[s] been officially approved by the 
Supreme Court or than is generally accepted in the legal academy or by 
Congress.”43  In the hands of a skilled lawyer, “recognized forms of legal 
argument” are a tool for shaping or preserving a preferred view of the 
law, not for objectively analyzing it.  Nevertheless, Professor Morrison 
suggests that observing stare decisis in the OLC “cuts both ways,” 
meaning that it applies equally to precedent expanding and limiting 
executive power.44  While this is true in theory, Goldsmith’s observation, 
Professor Morrison’s Madisonian model, and Morrison’s related 
suggestion that the executive branch may properly use the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine in its legal interpretation for purposes of “self-
protection,”45 indicate that, in practice, only one side of the knife is 
sharpened.46 
 
42. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1502–03. 
43. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 37.  Professor Morrison also notes that “[w]e can 
fairly predict that OLC will face great pressure to conform its views to those of the 
President, and it is worth attending to those pressures.”  Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra 
note 1, at 1455.  
44. Id. at 1503. 
45. Morrison, Avoidance, supra note 2, at 1232.  Professor Morrison accurately 
describes the canon as requiring that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to 
avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”  Id. at 1192 (citations omitted).  The canon’s “self-protective” use in 
interpreting constitutionally ambiguous powers is problematic because often it would 
seem to require presuming the fact to be proved, that there is a “serious constitutional 
problem” to be avoided while interpreting a statute delimiting executive power.  By way of 
example, one’s approach to interpreting a statute delimiting the nation’s conduct in war 
might differ if one presumes (or recklessly interprets precedent to conclude that) the 
President’s Commander-in-Chief power is entirely inherent and autonomous, and 
therefore that any such regulation potentially raises a “serious constitutional problem.” 
46. OLC insiders may object to this description of their role and approach.  Professor 
Morrison suggests that “[t]he in-between nature of [OLC’s] role can be ‘uncomfortabl[e]’ 
and difficult to specify in all its particulars, but that does not make it incoherent or 
unattainable.”  Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1502 (internal citation omitted).  
Professor Morrison’s clearly superior knowledge of OLC practice may support this 
observation.  It would seem to be incumbent upon OLC alumni to better explain, or 
perhaps demonstrate through public disclosure, how it “defends” executive branch 
institutional interests without tending toward advocacy in the form of favorable situational 
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Professor Morrison also asserts that judicial precedent resolving 
issues of executive power by settled practice supports the observance of 
stare decisis in the OLC,47 while recognizing that public and 
congressional disclosure is important.48  Putting to one side the slightly 
circular reasoning of this argument (because “settled” OLC precedent 
coupled with presidential action and congressional acquiescence 
becomes law in some cases, OLC precedent should be observed because 
it is “a more central, constitutive part of what the law is”49), the fact that 
the courts sometimes consider “historical gloss” when resolving 
constitutional issues only serves to emphasize the importance of OLC’s 
giving the best view of the law and correcting erroneous precedent. 
Courts resort to settled historical practice on the belief that it 
represents the good faith understanding of the elected branches, equally 
sworn to uphold and support the Constitution, as to the constitutional 
assignment or balance of power.50  If OLC consistently favors the 
institutional and policy concerns of the executive branch and also 
observes stare decisis, such gloss will come to represent not what the 
Constitution permits or assigns, but what the executive branch has, over 
time, found to be acceptable legal argument rather than correct legal 
analysis.  In the worst case, perhaps represented by the torture 
memoranda, OLC opinions may reflect what a current administration 
finds to be expedient legal argument supporting a predetermined policy 
decision that is simply judicially and politically unchallengeable under 
the circumstances.51  In any case, the gradual accumulation of executive-
friendly precedent—especially when classified or otherwise publicly, 
politically, and judicially unreviewable52—may incrementally expand 
 
or “self-protective” legal analysis. 
47. Id. at 1495–96 (noting efficiency gains by not treating each issue as one of first 
impression and by viewing earlier OLC precedent as constitutional “gloss”). 
48. Id. at 1499–500 (“Assertions of executive power that are kept secret from 
Congress constitute evasions of [the separation of powers] checking mechanism . . . .”). 
49. Id. at 1504. 
50. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence 
endorsed resort to settled practice when there exists “a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it 
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government.”  343 U.S. 579, 610–
11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327 (1936) (“[W]hile this court may not, and should not, hesitate to 
declare acts of Congress . . . to be unconstitutional . . . an impressive array of legislation 
such as we have just set forth . . . must be given unusual weight in the process of reaching 
a correct determination of the problem.”). 
51. See, e.g., Dehn, supra note 40, at 7 (“[C]laims of plenary commander-in-chief 
power [are] more than a ‘persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy.’  They 
sustain an ability to act in complete secrecy on a broad range of matters, avoiding political 
discourse that might lead to controversy until a given matter is a fait accompli.” (citation 
omitted)). 
52. Professor Morrison recognizes that “many of the issues addressed by OLC are 
unlikely ever to come before a court in justiciable form” and that therefore “OLC’s 
opinions often represent the final word in those areas unless later overruled by OLC itself, 
the Attorney General, or the President.”  Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1451. 
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claims of executive power and upset what Justice Jackson called the 
“constitutional equilibrium.”53  A fair view of the available information is 
that observing stare decisis in the OLC would, more often than not, 
trend in this direction. 
The OLC’s over-identification with executive branch institutional 
interests, and the most likely effect of its over-identification, counsel 
against observing stare decisis in the OLC.  Objective analysis and 
independent judgment can serve to correct any trends toward overly 
expansive claims of executive power, while the mere existence of 
precedent and a simple requirement to explain deviations from it should 
curtail such claims in most cases (those not involving secrecy and 
expedient legal argument).  This discussion also implicates the possible 
effect of constitutional obligations and professional responsibilities on 
an OLC’s lawyer’s role, and on the identification of OLC’s “client.” 
II.  THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The D.C. Circuit has observed that a government attorney’s oath 
means that “[u]nlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government 
lawyer . . . cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”54  
This view is also supported by professional responsibility norms and 
academic commentary.  Diverse sources agree that the executive’s 
constitutional oath and obligations are relevant to OLC’s advisory 
function.  The Department of Justice’s Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR) approvingly cited what is often called OLC’s Best 
Practices Memorandum for the proposition that “OLC’s core function is 
to help the President fulfill his constitutional duty to uphold the 
Constitution and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”55  
Commentators—frequently OLC alumni—agree,56 but understandings 
of the legal and practical effect of this fact appear to vary widely.57  This 
 
53. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
54. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
55. OPR Report, supra note 18, at 17 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
56. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function:  The Legal 
Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 337, 351 (1993) (“[I]nsofar as the 
[P]resident has the express responsibility to take care that the Laws including the 
Constitution as the supreme law be faithfully executed, enforcing an invalid law would be 
contrary to a [P]resident’s constitutional duty and oath.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney 
General:  A Normative, Descriptive and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 375, 
380 (1993) (“[A] model of the Attorney General as opinion writer would begin with the 
notion that he is aiding the President in carrying out the legal responsibilities, including 
that of constitutional interpretation, with which the President has been entrusted by the 
Constitution itself.”). 
57. An exhaustive list is impractical here, but an excellent source collecting views on 
the role of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, and OLC in this context is Robert C. 
Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. Legal Prof. 39 (2009); see also McGinnis, supra note 56, 
at 382–406 (comparing, contrasting, and critiquing various approaches Attorney General 
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is perhaps a reflection of the varied approaches to lawyering in the 
broader legal profession.58  This Part introduces how these constitutional 
and professional responsibility obligations might counsel, and perhaps 
even require, OLC attorneys to subordinate institutional interests and 
prudential concerns supporting the observance of stare decisis to their 
best view of the law. 
Little commentary thoroughly examines the extent to which the 
individual constitutional oaths of OLC or other executive branch 
attorneys relate to or supplement the executive branch’s constitutional 
obligations.59  A weak view might posit that they are largely superfluous 
in a unitary executive already constitutionally obligated to “faithfully 
execute” the law.  Such a view would discount the apparent purpose of 
constitutionally or statutorily requiring the oath from all executive, 
legislative, and judicial officials—to ensure each federal government 
official is loyal first to the Constitution rather than to her state, branch, 
department, institution, office, official, or political party.  Such oaths 
might therefore have practical value for government attorneys, rather 
than simply moral force. 
Of many possible effects of the oath, one might be identifying the 
client.  The earlier-referenced OPR Report stated that the executive 
branch is OLC’s client.60  Like the Army,61 it identified the client as the 
larger organization within which an attorney is situated, rather than as 
the departments, officers, or agencies she advises.  An oath to support 
the Constitution, however, undermines the notion that a government 
lawyer’s professional responsibilities run to only one of the three 
branches it creates.  Thus, it might be said that an OLC lawyer’s client is 
the Constitution, or, perhaps even more appropriately, the government 
that it creates.  Some have argued that a government lawyer’s client is 
the rule of law itself.62 
Accepting the view that the “government” is the client would place 
OLC on roughly the same footing as corporate counsel.  Whether 
corporate counsel advise the chief executive officer, the board of 
directors, a major corporate department, or a senior corporate officer, 
their client is properly understood as the legal entity created by the 
corporate charter, not as the officers, departments, or other individuals 
 
and OLC should take to law and executive branch when giving legal advice). 
58. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers 36–39, 80–83 (1996) 
(discussing varying ideologies influencing legal profession, including those that overvalue 
client interests). 
59. See, e.g., Note, Without Lawyers:  An Ethical View of the Torture Memos, 23 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics 241, 267 (2010) (“A government lawyer, then, is obliged to consider more 
than his client’s wishes.  He is bound by his oath to uphold the Constitution and, by 
extension, the laws of the Nation.”). 
60. OPR Report, supra note 18, at 17 (“If the OLC fails to provide complete and 
objective legal advice, it fails to properly advise its client—the Executive Branch.”) 
61. See U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 27–26, Rules of Prof’l Conduct for Lawyers, app. 
B, R. 1.13 (1992). 
62. Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 175, 220 (2006) 
(citation omitted). 
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receiving their advice.63  The main difference in this context, of course, 
is the relationship of the law to the “corporation.”  In the context of a 
private corporation, the law is extrinsic to the corporation and its 
charter.  In the government, the fundamental law is also the corporate 
charter.  It is therefore true that “[l]egal advice to the President from the 
Department of Justice is neither like advice from a private attorney nor 
like a politically neutral ruling from a court.”64  It would appear that the 
closer it is to the latter, however, the better the “constitutional 
corporation” and the rule of law that creates it are served. 
Even assuming the client is properly identified as the executive 
branch, another possible effect of the oath may be to more clearly 
elevate a government lawyer’s obligations to the law above those owed 
the client.  All lawyers have professional responsibility obligations both to 
the law and to their clients.65  They must sometimes decide difficult 
questions of ethical duty where obligations to the law and to a client 
might conflict.66  If the executive branch is an OLC attorney’s client, a 
constitutional oath might serve to remind the attorney that the interests 
of the law and not the client are paramount.67  As the OPR Report 
stated, “[i]n order to effect its mission of providing authoritative legal 
advice to the executive branch, the OLC must remain independent and 
produce thorough, objective, and candid legal opinions.”68  This is 
certainly the professional responsibility of every licensed attorney, but it 
carries greater meaning and consequence for government lawyers 
guiding the powerful arms of government and solemnly sworn to 
support the fundamental law. 
Observing either of these possible effects would seem to require 
OLC to remove the lens through which it views both the law and its 
precedent—to discard its executive branch glasses.  While OLC must 
undoubtedly assist the President to preserve the separation of powers, it 
must do so only in ways that comport with the best view of the law.  The 
diversity of legal scholarship on what the law is indicates that the 
ideological (or even neutrally derived) theoretical predisposition of OLC 
 
63. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13 (2010) (outlining professional 
responsibilities when representing an organization as a client). 
64. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 35. 
65. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. (“A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the 
requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business 
and personal affairs.”); see also id. R. 1.2(d) (stating “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client 
to engage, or assist a client, in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,” but 
may assist a client “to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning 
or application of the law”); id. R. 1.16(a)(1) (mandating withdrawal from representation 
that would result in violation of law). 
66. Ann. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 102 (2007) (discussing various state rules 
regarding disclosure of privileged client information to prevent crime or fraud, noting 
some states permit disclosure while some require it in some circumstances). 
67. See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 
77 Fordham L. Rev. 1333, 1362 (2009) (“[Government l]awyers cannot understand their 
role as merely executing their clients’ preferences; the distinctive function of lawyers is 
that they act as agents of their clients, but only within the bounds of the law.”). 
68. OPR Report, supra note 18, at 260 (emphasis added). 
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lawyers may affect the consistency of OLC’s opinions.  One hopes that 
such predispositions will naturally subordinate to an OLC lawyer’s 
obligation to provide objective, accurate, and independent advice, 
though there are clear indications that this is not the case.69  In fact, 
some commentary indicates that an executive branch lawyer’s 
preexisting ideology or understanding of the law is replaced with OLC’s 
executive-centric approach.70  Nevertheless, adherence to one’s oath of 
office appears to require that the opinions of predecessors receive due 
consideration, but ultimately that OLC give advice based upon the best 
view of the law.71 
Of course, arguments that one’s constitutional oath might require 
her to overrule or ignore erroneous precedent are potentially just as 
applicable to the judiciary.  Judicial observance of stare decisis is 
certainly “one of the main devices thought to constrain political and 
ideological preferences within the Judicial Branch.”72  Because stare 
decisis is not constitutionally mandated, there are plausible arguments 
both for and against its propriety.  It is, nevertheless, a constitutionally 
derived form of judicial decisionmaking.73  Judicial opinions are, for 
better or worse, a constitutional gloss that coordinate branches ignore at 
their peril.  OLC opinions are not, and should not be.74 
While I agree with Professor Morrison that many considerations 
supporting judicial stare decisis are “portable” to the executive branch, 
this does not mean that those considerations carry the day.  Institutional 
 
69. See Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 34 (describing author’s selection as OLC head 
as result of his legal “philosophical attunement” with key administration officials and 
noting this attunement “would shape [his] legal decisions as the head of OLC”). 
70. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama 
Administration and International Law, Remarks at the 104th Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“[Executive branch attorneys] are expected to look to the previous opinions of 
the Attorneys General and of heads of [the State Department Legal Adviser’s] office to 
develop and refine the executive branch’s legal positions.” (emphasis added)); see also supra 
note 23 and accompanying text (discussing institutional views which ought to guide OLC 
lawyer’s work). 
71. Indeed, it may be this fact alone that will prevent John Yoo from professional 
disciplinary action.  See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1452 n.11 (citing OLC 
memoranda finding Yoo’s views were held in good faith).  This indicates both the strength 
and weakness of accepting this view of a government attorney’s oath. 
72. Id. at 1448. 
73. I, like Professor Morrison, am quite sympathetic to the constitutional arguments 
supporting stare decisis in judicial adjudication.  See id. at 1492 n.174. 
74. Professor Morrison may believe this statement to be descriptively false within the 
executive branch given his view that OLC opinions are a “source of law” for that branch.  
Id. at 1493.  However, the point is that neither the judiciary nor Congress need accept 
OLC’s view of the law, no matter how often repeated.  Professor Morrison seems to agree 
with this view.  See id. at 1500–51 (noting longstanding disagreement between Congress 
and presidency over congressional regulation of certain foreign affairs matters and 
concluding “it should be permissible for OLC to give extra weight to longstanding 
executive branch understandings of executive power unless and until the courts resolve 
the matter in favor of Congress, or Congress takes some other measure forcing the 
Executive’s acquiescence”). 
86 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR Vol. 110:73 
and practical realities are clearly different.  Judicial opinions are (almost 
universally) public, and result from an adversarial process intended to 
prevent legal and factual error.  The secrecy of much of OLC’s work, as 
well as its insulated position in the executive branch and “special 
sensitivity to incursions on executive power,”75 might tend toward the 
development of dysfunctional norms and the perpetuation of executive-
friendly legal errors.  This potential self-dealing problem, which 
Professor Morrison acknowledges but perhaps too easily overcomes,76 
ultimately weakens arguments in favor of observing judicial principles of 
stare decisis in the OLC.   
CONCLUSION 
Professor Morrison makes a strong prudential case for the 
application of judicial stare decisis principles to OLC legal opinions.  
While institutional and other considerations play a role in the analysis of 
this issue, misinterpreting or overemphasizing institutional 
considerations weaken the value of OLC precedent, and thereby the 
propriety of adhering to it.  Overemphasizing institutional concerns also 
masks the important place of individual legal and ethical obligations in 
the dialogue.  A complete theoretical inquiry must more thoroughly 
consider the import and effect of these individual considerations.  Given 
these individual obligations, “differences in opinion”—a good faith 
finding of simple legal error after due consideration of precedent and 
thorough legal analysis—might be sufficient to “overrule” OLC 
precedent, and perhaps even demand it. 
A personal story might serve to amplify this point and to reveal my 
own potential bias.  In 2004, only weeks before the public airing of 
photos depicting abuse at Abu Ghraib, I was assigned as the new legal 
advisor to two criminal investigations into late-2002 deaths of detainees 
at Bagram, Afghanistan.  These investigations produced evidence of 
abusive practices surrounding the interrogation and internment of the 
decedents and others.  As I studied the law to determine the proper 
scope of the investigations going forward, OLC memoranda justifying 
enhanced interrogation techniques were leaked to the media.  After 
reviewing them closely, I determined that these memoranda contained 
flawed and incomplete legal analysis and were, at any rate, inapplicable 
to the subjects of these investigations.  The Army ultimately prosecuted 
cases involving not torture but “merely” unlawful, unauthorized, and 
unjustified acts of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by 
interrogators and guards.77 
In the course of my work, it never occurred to me that erroneous 
 
75. Id. at 1503. 
76. See id. at 1502–03 (claiming OLC’s location within executive branch “does not 
compel any particular understanding of the precise scope of executive power”). 
77. In full disclosure, it was not possible to determine criminal responsibility for 
every questionable practice or event raised by the evidence.  Additionally, the 
investigations and prosecutions never established criminal responsibility for the deaths. 
2010 GOVERNMENT LAWYERING WITHOUT GLASSES 87 
OLC legal opinions, charitably described as “deeply flawed,” “sloppily 
reasoned, overbroad, and incautious,”78 and less charitably as “torturing 
the law,”79 might be a “source of law . . . within the executive branch.”80  
My oath and professional responsibilities were to the law, not to an 
erroneous legal opinion; my ethical obligation as a prosecutor was to 
ensure the appropriate measure of justice for the victims and for any 
potential defendants. 
Upon returning to West Point, I was encouraged to see that a 
monument to the Constitution had been erected a few years after I had 
graduated.  A plaque on that monument provides: 
The United States boldly broke with the ancient military 
custom of swearing loyalty to a leader.  Article VI required that 
American officers thereafter swear loyalty to our basic law, the 
Constitution. 
While many other nations have suffered military coups, the 
United States never has.  Our American code of military 
obedience requires that, should orders and the law ever 
conflict, our officers must obey the law.  Many other nations 
have adopted our principle of loyalty to the basic law. 
This nation must have military leaders of principle and 
integrity so strong that their oaths to support and defend the 
Constitution will unfailingly govern their actions.  The purpose 
of the United States Military Academy is to provide such leaders 
of character.81 
It is not only our country’s military leaders who take this oath.  Thus, it 
may be not only OLC’s responsibility to correct or ignore legal error 
rather than to perpetuate it, but also every government lawyer’s or other 
official’s solemn obligation—to be diligently researched, objectively 
analyzed, and judiciously exercised.  
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